ALERT UPDATE 2020 – WEEKLY REPORT U.S. Supreme Court and Circuit Court Wins
Edition: Week of May 26-30, 2025
SUPREME COURT WATCH
The Justices held their May 29, 2025 conference yesterday. We expect Orders on June 2, 2025.
On Tuesday, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on whether possible 2255 claims can provide basis for 3582(c)(1)(A) sentence reduction. See below:
In Fernandez, Joe v. United States, (No. 24-556)(Cert. Granted, May 26, 2025) --Here is the the Question Presented from the defendant's full cert petition in Fernandez:
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court has broad discretion to reduce the term of imprisonment in any case if it finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction.” The sole limitation Congress placed on that discretion is found in 18 U.S.C. § 994(t), which provides that “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an
extraordinary and compelling reason.” In reversing the district court’s grant of compassionate release to Joe Fernandez, the Second Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion for the
court to have considered evidence bearing on Fernandez’s potential innocence as well to have found a disparity in sentences between Fernandez and several of his co-defendants who were
cooperating witnesses. That decision was contrary to decisions of the First and Ninth Circuits, which have each held that district courts are not restricted with respect to matters they may
consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) other than as set forth by Congress. The question presented is:
Whether the Second Circuit erred in recognizing extra-textual limitations on what information a court may consider when determining whether there exist extraordinary and compelling reasons
warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
United States v. Sterjak, (No. 23-8088-cr)(2nd Cir. May 23, 2025)– Defendant-Appellant Klaudio Sterkaj appeals the sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Scullin, J.), arguing that the court committed procedural error by increasing his sentence based on his refusal to cooperate with the Government. The parties agree that the variance was imposed for that reason. Under binding precedent established in United States v. Stratton, 820 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1987), a district court may not impose a higher sentence due to a defendant’s usal to cooperate. Stratton has not been overruled by the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc, and therefore remains controlling. The Government argued that intervening Supreme Court decisions undermine Stratton’s validity. The Court disagreed. None of the cited decisions directly conflict with or abrogate Stratton. Accordingly, the Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge.
United States v. Outlaw, (No. 24-2114)(3rd Cir. May 28, 2025)– Though they are often discussed in tandem, probable cause to search is not the same as probable cause to arrest. The facts in this case could have plausibly supported a search of Appellee Abdul Outlaw’s vehicle. But they did not support his arrest, and therefore did not support a search incident to his arrest. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the District Court’s order suppressing the fruits of the officer’s unlawful search.
United States v. Hodge, (No. 23-2881)(7th Cir. May 28, 2025)– Kevin Hodge was involved with the acquisition and distribution of a variety of illegal drugs. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Because of the large quantity of narcotics at issue, his crime would typically carry a ten-year statutory minimum sentence. But Hodge met the requirements of the statutory “safety valve,” which requires district courts to disregard mandatory minimums. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Relying on his eligibility for the safety valve, Hodge requested a sentence below the statutory minimum. The district court sentenced him to ten years, but it did not discuss his entitlement to safety valve relief. As the court did not engage with this principal mitigating argument, the Court vacated Hodge’s sentence and remanded for resentencing.
United States v. Maryboy, (No. 23-4117)(10th Cir. May 29, 2025)--Two errors in the trial court may have led a jury to convict Perry Maryboy of second-degree murder instead of the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. There is a fine line between second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. The plain errors of allowing Agent Olson to opine on Maryboy’s mental state and failing to instruct the jury that the government had to disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt may have led the jury to convict on the former instead of the latter. Though satisfying plain-error review is difficult, the Court concluded that Maryboy has met its requirements, and thus reversed Maryboy’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.
OTHER NEWSLast month, the Sixth Circuit held that USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6)—the compassionate release guideline allowing courts to consider overly long sentences
that could not be imposed under current law—exceeds the Sentencing Commission’s authority. The Third Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v. Rutherford, which is now before
the U.S. Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari. The case has already been relisted for further consideration, often a sign of genuine interest from the Justices.
That interest is reinforced by the Court’s recent decision above to grant certiorari in Fernandez v. United States, a related case involving whether extraordinary and compelling reasons
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) can include grounds that might also justify relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In Fernandez, the district court granted compassionate release based on substantial
evidence of actual innocence and sentencing disparity among co-defendants. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that § 3582(c)(1)(A) cannot consider factors appropriate for habeas relief.
This ruling diverges from the First and Ninth Circuits, which have held that district courts may consider a wide range of reasons—except rehabilitation alone—under § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Supreme Court is now poised to clarify the scope of judicial discretion in compassionate release cases. Fernandez and Rutherford are closely linked. It would not be surprising if the Court grants certiorari in Rutherford as well and consolidates the two cases for argument.
Rutherford also draws significant amicus support. FAMM, six law school professors, and a group of 12 former federal judges have filed briefs in support. Notably, former Bureau of Prisons officials, represented by civil rights attorney Scott Lewis, argue that expanding compassionate release for prisoners serving unusually long sentences would relieve strain on the BOP. Aging, ill inmates consume disproportionate resources, undermining operations and safety. The brief highlights that those serving grossly excessive sentences are especially likely to become elderly or disabled behind bars.
The Supreme Court’s upcoming decisions could reshape the future of compassionate release—both in scope and practical application.
IS YOUR CONVICTION OR SENTENCE CHALLENGEABLE?Recent Executive Orders and circuit rulings have reopened the door for:
- § 922(g) firearm convictions (non-violent, non-drug priors); and
- Compassionate release motions based on non-retroactive § 403(a) stacking reforms.
Recent wins in the 3rd, 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits show courts are rethinking prior convictions and excessive sentencing on § 922(g) convictions.
Please Provide:
- Contact’s name + telephone number
- Court of conviction
- Case number
We’ll notify your contact if relief may be available. Call: (832) 346-0220.
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We offer professional, affordable evaluations for:
- Direct appeals
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