U. S. Supreme Court Happenings, Favorable Federal Circuit Opinions-- for the Week of March 24-28, 2025--
U. S. Supreme Court Happenings– Week Ending March 28, 2025 –
The Justices met for their March 28, 2025 conference today. We expect orders on Monday.
On Wednesday, The Supreme Court decided the so-called "ghost gun" case, Bondi v. Vanderstok, (No. 23-852) (March 26, 2025), which addressed the lawfulnees of an ATF rule interpreting the Gun Control Act of 1968 to cover weapon parts kits. By a 7-2 vote, the Court ruled that the "GCA embraces, and thus permits ATF to regulate, some weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers." Justice Gorsuch, who wrote the opinion for the majority, disposed of a "rule of lenity" argument in just a sentence.
Last Friday, the U. S. Supreme Court handed down a unanimous opinion in favor of a federal criminal defendant on a statutory issue in Thompson v.
United States, (No. 23–1095) (S. Ct. March 21, 2025).The opinion for the Court, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, begins and ends this way:
Patrick Thompson took out three loans totaling $219,000 from the same bank. Later, Thompson told the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that he had “borrowed . . . $110,000” from
the bank. Thompson was indicted under 18 U.S.C. §1014 for making “false statement[s]” to the FDIC. Thompson argued that his statements were not false because he had in fact taken out a loan
for $110,000 just as he said. Both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit held that they did not need to consider that argument. In their view, the prohibition in §1014 against “false
statement[s]” extends to misleading ones as well, and Thompson’s statements were at least misleading in failing to mention the additional loans. The question presented is whether §1014
criminalizes statements that are misleading but not false....
In casual conversation, people use many overlapping words to describe shady statements: false, misleading, dishonest, deceptive, literally true, and more. Only one of those words appears in
the statute. Section 1014 does not criminalize statements that are misleading but true. Under the statute, it is not enough that a statement is misleading. It must be “false.”
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The U. S. Supreme Court also handed down an opinion in favor of the government on a statutory issue in Delligatti v. United States, (No. 23–825)
(S. Ct. March 21, 2025). The opinion for the Court, authored by Justice Thomas, begins and ends this way:
Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) defines a “crime of violence” to include a felony that involves the “use of physical force” against another person. In the context of a closely related statute, we
have held that “the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force.” United States v. Castleman, 572 U. S. 157, 169 (2014). This case asks whether
that principle extends to § 924(c)(3)(A) and, if so, whether the principle holds in cases where an offender causes bodily injury by omission rather than action. We answer both questions in the
affirmative....
The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the use of physical force against another person. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit is affirmed.
2nd Circuit
United States v. Armenteros-Chervoni, (No. 23-1447)(1st Cir. March 20, 20-25)– In 2023, Jorge Luis Armenteros-Chervoni ("Armenteros"), an attorney in Puerto Rico, was convicted of five offenses in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The convictions related to a visit that Armenteros made on a single day to a federal correctional institution in the Commonwealth. Three of the convictions were for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) by "mak[ing] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation." The other two were for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(1) and (b)(4) by attempting to "provide[] to an inmate of a prison a prohibited object." On appeal, Armenteros contended that the convictions must be vacated either because the indictment setting forth the underlying charges was multiplicitous or for trial error. The Court agreed that two of the three § 1001(a)(2) convictions and one of the two § 1791(a)(1) and (b)(4) convictions must be vacated because the underlying charges were multiplicitous. Armenteros's convictions and corresponding sentences as to Counts Two, Four, and Five are vacated and remanded for resentencing.
2nd Circuit
United States v. Dennis, (No. 23-6194)(2d Cir. March 21, 2025)--Willie Dennis appealed from an amended judgment entered after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Rakoff, J.), convicting him of three counts of cyberstalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B). Dennis argues that § 2261A(2)(B) is unconstitutional as applied in his case because the trial evidence was insufficient to prove that his electronic communications constituted “true threats,” i.e., threats of physical harm, so as to fall outside the First Amendment’s protection of free speech. In any event, Dennis submits that erroneous jury instructions allowed the jury to find him guilty without proof of true threats, and that he was unduly prejudiced by trial rulings precluding him from eliciting certain evidence and by trial judge statements made in the presence of the jury about his pro se status. The Court found that the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find true threats as to the electronic communications at issue in Counts One and Four, but insufficient to support such a finding as to the communications at issue in Count Two. Thus, the Court reversed Dennis’s conviction on Count Two.
6th Circuit
United States v. Grogan, (No. 22-3651)(6th Cir. March 27, 2025)– A jury convicted Juan Grogan of possessing a firearm as a felon, possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute. At trial, the judge allowed the government to admit testimony about a series of statements that Grogan made during a proffer session. The statements concerned his ownership of drugs, a firearm, and a wallet, and his involvement in a shooting and a kidnapping. On appeal, Grogan argued the admission of this evidence was an error. Under the proffer agreement, the government could introduce a particular statement from the proffer session if Grogan testified or presented arguments inconsistent with that statement. Grogan contended admission of the evidence was an error because neither of these conditions were met. Because the district court’s improper admission of Grogan’s proffer confessing ownership of the drugs was harmful and required reversal, the Court did not individually assess the harmful effect of the other improper proffer admissions. The Court agreed with Grogan that at least some of these statements should not have been admitted. And because the error was not harmless, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
9th Circuit
United States v. Holcomb, (No. 23-469)(9th Cir. March 27, 2025)– The panel reversed the district court’s ruling on John Holcomb’s motion to suppress three videos found on his computer, vacated his conviction and sentence and remanded for further proceedings. The panel held (1) the “dominion and control” provision of a second warrant to search Holcomb’s computer was invalid because it was both overbroad and insufficiently particular; (2) the good-faith exception does not apply to the examiner’s search of the computer; and (3) the plain view doctrine does not independently justify the examiner’s seizure of the videos.
COMMENT:Based on the recent executive order of President Trump, Alert2020 believes that anyone who was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and has a non-drug and non-violent predicate prior conviction should opt to have us look at their case to see if they may be able to challenge their § 922(g) conviction.
In light of the recent En Banc Third Circuit decisions in Range and Daniels, and the recent decisions in Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuit, we suggest that anyone with a non-violent non-drug conviction where they were charged under § 922(g) should opt for the quick lookup we are extending this offer through February of 2025. In addition, the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have determined that district courts may consider § 403(a)’s non-retroactive changes in combination with other factors presented by an incarcerated person. These Circuits effectively allow district courts to consider an incarcerated person’s stacked charges as an extraordinary and compelling reason, so long as they present another factor that may warrant compassionate release. In order to conduct the lookup, we will need an outside contact’s name and telephone number, where you went to court, and your case number. We will get in touch with your contact and let them know if you have any potential relief available from the above remedies. Our case evaluation telephone number for the above is (832) 346-0220.
For the last 30 years, we have been very successful on direct appeals, 2255 motions, 2241 Petitions, First Step Act and Compassionate Release Motions, Earned Time Credits, DC Superior Court Petitions, State Post Conviction, Clemencies and Pardons and other specialized motions to mention a few avenues for relief we cover. The WCE is an excellent low-cost tool to see what can be done for you at any stage of the proceedings. It is thorough and detailed from day one of your case to present with our recommendations of any remedies available to you to gain relief.
If you are serious about fighting your case and want us to evaluate your case to see if you may have relief coming, request a Written Case
Evaluation.